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Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson's speech at the National Press Club on 12 January 
1950 was among the most important and controversial US policy statements in the early 
history of the Cold War in East Asia. In it, he defined the American "defensive 
perimeter" in the Pacific as a line running through Japan, the Ryukyus, and the 
Philippines. This denied a guarantee of US military protection to the Republic of Korea 
(ROK) and the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. Less than six months later, North 
Korea launched a military offensive across the 38th parallel that nearly succeeded in 
imposing Communist rule over the entire peninsula. Critics immediately pointed to 
Acheson's National Press Club speech as giving Pyongyang the "green light" to pursue 
forcible reunification, based on the premise that the United States had ruled out military 
intervention to defend South Korea. More than fifty years after the start of the Korean 
War, countless South Koreans still hold Acheson responsible for igniting this fratricidal 
conflict. The United States, they bitterly maintain, committed an act of betrayal toward 
Korea ranking with President Theodore Roosevelt's approval of the Taft-Katsura 
Agreement in 1905 and President Harry S. Truman's agreement to divide the peninsula 
forty years later at the end of World War II.  
Release of Soviet documents during recent years has removed any doubt that North 
Korea planned and initiated the Korean War with the reluctant endorsement of Soviet 
leader Joseph Stalin. North Korea's leader Kim Il Sung had begun to press the Soviet 
Union to support an invasion shortly after creation of the Democratic People's Republic 
of Korea (DPRK) in September 1948. But Stalin withheld approval until April 1950 
mainly because he feared that the United States would intervene militarily, thereby 
risking escalation into a major war involving the Soviet Union. The reaction of shock and 
panic in the ROK to Acheson's exclusion of South Korea from the American defensive 
perimeter has been well-documented. Still unresolved, however, is the far more important 
question of the impact of the National Press Club speech on Joseph Stalin, Mao Zedong, 
and Kim Il Sung. This article presents evidence from recently released Soviet documents 
that Acheson's address had little if any impact on Communist deliberations. Stalin 
worried about US military intervention until the moment the Korean War began. 
Moreover, he feared that North Korea could not survive an attack that he was certain 
South Korea would stage in the future. His approval of Kim Il Sung's plan was a mistake, 
but it derived more from a sense of weakness rather than strength.  
There were two primary motivating factors behind Acheson's delivery of the National 
Press Club speech. First, the Truman administration was trying to implement a new 
China policy after the victory of the Communists in the Chinese Civil War. By late 1949, 
Truman and Acheson had decided that the People's Republic of China (PRC) would 
launch an invasion of Taiwan in the near future to destroy the last remnants of Jiang 
Jieshi's government.1 The president announced his determination to remain uninvolved in 
the Chinese Civil War on 5 January 1950, explaining that while the United States would 
continue economic aid to Taiwan, US military aid and advice would cease. Such an 
approach, Truman insisted, proved that the United States had no predatory designs on 
Chinese territory and sought no specific privileges or military bases. Acheson denied that 
the statement constituted any reversal of US policy. The United States, he explained, had 
recognized Taiwan as Chinese territory in World War II and would not violate its past 
agreements. Far more important, Acheson insisted that military aid would not help Jiang 
and the Guomindang. The United States could not give "a will to resist and a purpose for 
resistance to those who must provide it for themselves."2 Not only was the Truman 
administration attempting to build the foundation for future relations with the PRC, it also 
was defending itself against criticism from the Republicans for its alleged "loss of China" 
to the Soviet Union.3
A second goal of Acheson's speech was to build support for US policy in South Korea. 
Since the fall of 1947, the United States had been pursuing a policy there that sought to 
eliminate its commitment to military protection, but without ensuring Communist 
conquest of the ROK either as a result of internal political subversion or external military 
invasion. This explains the US decision to postpone withdrawal of its occupation forces 
until late June 1949, defying strenuous objections from US military leaders. Just three 
months earlier, Truman had approved National Security Council (NSC) Paper 8/2, which 
outlined steps for the creation of a South Korea that would achieve the economic, 
military, and political strength necessary to provide for its own survival with American 
financial aid and diplomatic support. A key provision of this plan was a three-year 
program of economic assistance that required Congressional approval. The administration 
tried to persuade Congress that despite its failure in China, the United States could 
succeed in Korea, even hinting at the possibility of future peaceful reunification under a 
government following the American model of economic, political, and social 
development. But Congress refused to pass the Korean aid bill, forcing the administration 
to settle for a continuation of temporary economic assistance to South Korea until 15 
February 1950. Economic deterioration in the ROK in the fall of 1949 further reduced 
prospects for approval of a long-term aid package.4
Acheson's Press Club speech thus sought to build support for passage of the Korean aid 
bill, which required demonstrating that US policy in Korea would have a better outcome 
than what had taken place in China. Scholars unfortunately focused attention thereafter 
on assessing Acheson's reference to the US "defensive perimeter" and ignored the 
remainder of the speech. After the outbreak of the Korean War, charges that Acheson had 
provided a "green light" for North Korea's invasion prevented a clear understanding of 
the address as a subtle, but realistic statement of the administration's policy in Asia after 
the Communist victory in China. It enunciated a conception of containment in Asia that 
NSC Paper 48 had outlined in the fall of 1949. Acheson, in his speech, asserted that the 
main issue in Asia was the struggle against economic privation and foreign domination. 
Asians considered national independence and self-government as the indispensible 
ingredients in the resolution of these two problems. The United States, he insisted, always 
had worked for Asian independence, while the Soviet Union attempted to rob Asians of 
control over their own affairs. The United States opposed Communism not for any self-
serving reason, but because it was the spearhead of Russian imperialism and a new Soviet 
strategy of domination. Acheson stressed that American efforts had to concentrate on 
avoiding any actions that obscured the true malevolent nature of Soviet tactics.5
Acheson's attitude toward the military capabilities of the United States in Asia reflected a 
realistic grasp of the limits of American power. Beyond Japan, the Ryukyus, and the 
Philippines, "it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military 
attack." In the event of open aggression outside this defensive perimeter, he announced, 
"the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon ... the United 
Nations which so far has not proved a weak reed to lean on by any people who are 
determined to protect their independence against outside aggression." The secretary of 
state claimed, however, that the military threat was not as immediate as the challenge of 
political "subversion and penetration." Communism exploited conditions of economic 
dislocation and social upheaval to advance the Soviet strategy for world domination. 
Acheson emphasized that without economic stability, Asian nations could not withstand 
the Soviet challenge. Through American economic aid, technical skill, and administrative 
advice, however, Asian nations could develop democratic institutions capable of fulfilling 
both popular needs and desires. But US aid alone was not enough, since Asian leaders 
themselves had to demonstrate the will to improve conditions. In China, for example, 
Jiang had not fostered an improvement of political and economic circumstances and the 
Chinese people had "brushed him aside."  
For Acheson, his strategy in Asia was the only logical US alternative. He pointed to 
Korea as a place where the United States could utilize economic assistance and foster the 
development of democracy. In Korea, "a very good chance" existed for successfully 
resisting Communist expansion. To refuse such aid to Korea would be "utter defeatism 
and utter madness." Acheson's containment strategy would succeed in Korea because, in 
contrast to China, the ROK wanted American aid and would use it effectively. The 
secretary of state concluded that "we have a greater opportunity to be effective" in Korea 
than anywhere else on the Asian mainland."6 Outlining the US "defensive perimeter" was 
then a secondary issue in Acheson's speech that reflected in part concern that President 
Syngman Rhee of South Korea might resort to military aggression against the north to 
achieve reunification. The secretary of state was attempting to caution the South Koreans 
that the United States would not guarantee absolutely the ROK's military security.7 
Furthermore, Acheson's speech constituted only public enunciation of Truman's postwar 
strategy of stressing economic assistance in Asia, rather than military power. Finally, 
General Douglas MacArthur in March 1949 had placed South Korea outside the same 
"defensive perimeter" that Acheson defined in his speech, because of his desire to 
redeploy US forces then in Korea back to Japan.8
Acheson's National Press Club speech thus outlined a realistic approach for addressing 
postwar American problems in Asia. It was also cautious and judicious in analyzing the 
relationship between communism and nationalism. As Tang Tsou writes, Acheson's 
policy "seemed to avoid any immediate risk of war, drew an easily defensible line to 
protect America's vital interests, and contained a long-term program for Asia which could 
be implemented by peaceful means."9 It made little sense to advocate direct intervention 
in the internal affairs of Asia when such a policy only would alienate people hostile to 
imperialism. But the United States could build friendship based on offers of assistance. 
Acheson reasoned that Asian nationalism would defeat Soviet imperialism with 
American aid and then reward the United States with its political support. North Korea's 
invasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950 ended any chance of finding out whether this 
policy would have succeeded because it justified the militarization of US policy in East 
Asia. Three days later, Republican Senator from Ohio Robert A. Taft held both Truman 
and Acheson responsible for the events leading to war in Korea, accusing them of 
pursuing a "bungling and inconsistent foreign policy" that had provided "basic 
encouragement to the North Korean aggression."10 For at least the next three decades, his 
interpretation of the National Press Club speech would become conspicuous in accounts 
explaining the Korean War. 
Presidential candidate General Dwight D. Eisenhower encouraged public acceptance of 
Acheson's responsibility for the Korean War during the fall of 1952 when in a speech in 
Cincinnati he attributed North Korea's attack to the Press Club speech. In response, an 
angry Acheson stated publicly that he had "used no language whatever 'excluding' Korea 
or any other area in the Asiatic mainland or suggesting any lack of interest by the United 
States in the event of an attack on any area of the Asian mainland in general or Korea in 
particular." In his memoirs, Acheson explained that his purpose in writing the speech was 
"to carry some sense of the problem in the Far East, the limitation of our power, and 
direction of our purpose." He categorically rejected the charge that he "gave the green 
light" to North Korea: 
This was specious, for Australia and New Zealand were not included either, and the first 
of all our mutual defense agreements was made with Korea. If the Russians were 
watching the United States for signs of our intentions in the Far East, they would have 
been more impressed by the two years' agitation for withdrawal of combat forces from 
Korea, the defeat in Congress of a minor aid bill for it, and the increasing discussion of a 
peace treaty with Japan. 
Acheson was surprised that critics focused on his reference to the American "defensive 
perimeter" because he believed that he had engaged neither in "innovating policy or 
political heresy."11 President Harry S. Truman surely agreed with this assessment, 
choosing not to even mention the speech or the "green light" theory in his memoirs.12
Several American military leaders who were important figures in the Korean War wrote 
accounts of the conflict. Generals Omar N. Bradley and J. Lawton Collins mentioned 
Acheson's speech, but discussed it only in the context of an overall US policy that 
showed indifference toward the fate of the ROK.13 General Douglas MacArthur, in his 
memoirs, noted that Acheson's policies in Asia received widespread condemnation in the 
United States. "I felt the Secretary of State was badly advised about the Far East," he 
wrote, implying that the Korean War proved it was wrong to allow diplomats to make 
military decisions. For General Matthew B. Ridgway, Acheson's "clear indication that we 
had no intention of defending Korea did nothing to give the enemy even momentary 
pause."14 A few early accounts of the Korean War would blame Acheson almost 
exclusively for North Korea's invasion. Robert T. Oliver, for example, wrote that the 
reason "why the war came" was because "American authoritative statements indicated 
that we would not defend Korea."15 For those reluctant to speculate about the impact of 
the speech on North Korea or the Soviet Union, many agreed that at least it was unwise, 
if not foolish, for Washington to publicize its policy and intentions toward Korea.16
A consensus soon emerged that Acheson's address was only one element in an overall US 
policy signaling North Korea and the Soviet Union that the United States would not 
intervene to halt an invasion of South Korea. David Rees, for example, wrote that 
"Acheson's Press Club speech only reflected a military weakness which the Communists 
knew already, that the US did not have the men to garrison South Korea, and that a mere 
UN commitment in Korea might mean that an indigenous Communist attack in an Asian 
country would be tolerated by the West out of weakness and miscalculation."17 Most 
writers agreed that Acheson had not given "away state secrets" and had said "nothing 
new."18 According to John W. Spanier, Acheson was  
only verbalizing the basic American strategy of total war, ... that had not calculated on ... 
a less than all-out challenge by a Soviet satellite in Asia against an American friend, 
whose strategic importance was not "worth" the price of total war. In short, it was not 
American words but American policy that probably encouraged the Communists to 
believe that the United States would not defend South Korea.19  
Certainly, historians had concluded that many US leaders shared blame for the failure to 
show a stronger commitment to South Korea's survival.20 This policy, according to 
Korean historian Kim Chum-kon, invited North Korea to launch its invasion and 
therefore constituted appeasement.21
For thirty years, the consensus remained firmly in place that the United States gave North 
Korea the "green light" to invade South Korea. In 1982, East Asian expert Claude A. 
Buss wrote that Acheson's speech was "virtually tantamount to an invitation" for 
Communist aggression. Buss perceptively added, however, that the address reflected the 
Truman administration's search for an effective policy in postwar Asia: 
Far from abandoning the ROK, Secretary Acheson called for a much broader defense 
than the United States could provide on its own. In directing attention to the nonmilitary 
factors in security and to the need for nonmilitary measures to solve problems stemming 
from the expansion of communism, he voiced ideas which, if heeded, might have avoided 
many of the most bitter consequences of Korea - and Vietnam. 
Buss reiterated that although Acheson's speech included the "first clear-cut statement on a 
United States defense perimeter in Asia," it only confirmed a long-standing military 
strategy. Nevertheless, it was "certainly an unwise and unskilled diplomatic maneuver to 
broadcast it openly to the world."22 Bevin Alexander agreed, arguing that the North 
Koreans concluded that the United States would not act to save South Korea. "The 
mistake they made," he writes, "was to believe" the public pronouncements of US 
leaders.23
Release of classified US documents on policy toward Korea after World War II revived 
debate about whether the Acheson speech provided a "green light" for North Korea's 
invasion. William Stueck pointed to the Press Club speech as a prime example of how US 
"actions did not fall into a consistent pattern that conveyed a deep American 
commitment" to South Korea. More public demonstrations of strong US support "might 
have served as warning signals to the Kremlin."24 Robert J. Donovan agreed, claiming 
that although Kim Il Sung already had developed his plans for invading South Korea 
before Acheson's speech, "it made Kim and Stalin and Mao more confident that the 
venture could succeed."25 But for other writers, "why North Korea invaded South Korea 
in the first place" was not simple to explain because, according to Burton Kaufman, "the 
conflict between North and South Korea was a true civil war." "Acheson's speech," he 
surmised, "must have led Kim to expect that the United States would not intervene in the 
struggle, while he would anticipate continued Soviet military support."26 For Callum 
McDonald, 
Acheson's speech was in fact an exercise in ambiguity, designed to restrain both sides. In 
this respect, it was a faithful reflection of American policy. Washington did not express 
uninterest but refused to spell out in advance its attitude towards an armed assault against 
its Korean creation. In the meantime, Washington hoped that the worst would never 
happen.27
By contrast, some writers no longer even mentioned the Acheson speech.28
Peter Lowe, nicely summarizing the new consensus that emerged in the 1980s, wrote that 
the National Press Club speech "was a crisp, forthright address covering much ground but 
too explicit on a few aspects that would have been better cloaked with at least some 
opaqueness." Acheson's words were "too blunt" and had a direct impact on igniting the 
Korean War: 
It was unquestionably foolish to convey the impression that Korea was expendable. North 
Korea and the Soviet Union could only have drawn encouragement in the belief that 
America would most likely not act with vigour if North Korea moved against the south to 
reunify the peninsula.29
"Without access to North Korean or Soviet archives," James Stokesbury added, "no one 
can say the speech was a green light, but it may safely be assumed that it was not a red or 
even a yellow one."30 John Merrill partially filled this documentary void, relying on 
North Korean public statements and interviews to support his conclusion that the 
Acheson speech 
was also noticed in Pyongyang. A former North Korean journalist, who claims that he 
personally delivered the news to Kim Il Sung after reading wire service reports, later 
recalled that the North Korean leader was greatly excited to learn of the speech.31
In the absence of documentary evidence, however, the actual impact of the address on 
North Korean policy remained a matter of speculation.  
Bruce Cumings advanced by far the most fascinating interpretation of the impact of 
Acheson's Press Club speech. "South Korea," he wrote, "was not pointedly excluded from 
the American defense perimeter." "Certain nations (Japan) would be defended, and in 
other threatened nations (like the ROK), initial reliance would be on those attacked to 
defend themselves, and if they could not, the implication was, the situation would be 
reevaluated." Perhaps more important, Cumings noted that "the North Koreans thought 
Acheson included the ROK in his perimeter" after reading a false report in the New York 
Times. "The real effect of the speech," he argued, "was probably to keep [the North 
Koreans] off balance, wary, unsure about what might come next - exactly Acheson's 
intent with regard to both Koreas." His ultimate goal was to use deception to manuever 
the Communists into taking action that would justify creating through political and 
economic means American dominance of a "great crescent" from Japan to Southeast Asia 
to India. Cumings relied on a remarkable metaphor to illustrate his argument: 
Acheson is the linebacker and he knows they may come around the end, or throw a pass, 
or come off tackle. A properly constructed defense encourages the offense to choose one 
instead of another option; it creates a field of force that constrains enemy decision. ... 
More noteworthy is Richard Nixon's rendering of Acheson's logic; he chose a metaphor 
from his favorite game, poker: 'the North Koreans thought our intentions were face up on 
the board. ... It [June 25] was a miscalculation by them, based upon a misrepresentation 
by us.' 
Acheson, presumably the Dick Butkus of US foreign policy, thus used his National Press 
Club speech to manipulate North Korea into attacking. "The idea that Acheson naively 
gave the green light to Stalin or Kim, or that this was where American deterrence failed 
is," for Cumings, "a fantasy."32
Sergei Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai were among the first to make use of 
Soviet documents and interviews in Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean 
War. Endorsing the traditional view, they claimed that Stalin "consented" to Kim Il 
Sung's idea for an invasion because American demobilization and the Truman 
administration's words had indicated the United States would not intervene to save the 
ROK. Relying on an interview with V.P. Tkachenko, former head of the Korean section 
of the Communist Party's Central Committee, they wrote that Acheson's National Press 
Club speech "was quickly sent to Moscow, was carefully studied by Stalin and had a 
significant impact on his thinking." It was Kim Il Sung who set the date for the offensive, 
but the invasion was "preplanned, blessed, and directly assisted by Stalin and his 
generals, and reluctantly backed by Mao at Stalin's insistence."33 Stueck was not as 
emphatic, writing that "Stalin suspected that in a pinch there would be little support for 
collective intervention to save South Korea." Confirming his reputation for caution, the 
Soviet leader "stood willing to accept a certain risk ... owing to his knowledge through 
espionage of America's lack of readiness for war with the Soviet Union - militarily, 
politically, and economically - and to his desire to ensure support for his leadership at 
home and on his eastern and western borders."34
Cold War assumptions and a belief in American exceptionalism have made it difficult for 
even recent historians to believe that Acheson's words did not have a decisive impact on 
igniting the Korean War. In 1990, Harry Summers blamed Acheson exclusively for 
encouraging Moscow and Beijing to "give their blessing" to the North Korean attack. The 
National Press Club speech, he writes, made "it plain that the United Staes had 
abandoned [South Korea] altogether."35 Kenneth B. Lee wrote in 1997 that Acheson had 
decided to abandon Korea and his speech was "an open invitation to an attack by the 
Communists." After the speech, "Stalin knew the United States would not go to the aid of 
South Korea if it was attacked."36 Referring to the Acheson address as "notorious," 
Michael Hickey concluded that the "speech carried enormous weight" because it 
confirmed that the United States no longer planned to protect South Korea. Along with 
the withdrawal of US troops and the successful testing of an atomic bomb during 1949, it 
"lured" Stalin into approving Kim's plans for the invasion.37 And most recently, Stanley 
Sandler has asserted that Acheson's "notorious speech" "set off alarm bells in Seoul" and 
"encouraged aggressive thoughts in Pyongyang," "In 1992," he wrote, "a returned 
[Korean People's Army] general reminisced that Acheson's speech did produce 'a certain 
influence on Kim Il Sung'."38
Since 1994, the release of additional Soviet documents has added more information to the 
record of events leading to North Korea's launching of its invasion of South Korea on 25 
June 1950. A more accurate assessment of the impact of Acheson's Press Club speech on 
Stalin's decision to authorize Kim Il Sung to initiate the war is now possible. Relying on 
as yet unreleased documents, Soviet scholar Evgueni Bajanov emphasizes that a desire to 
avoid war with the United States dominated Stalin's thinking about Korea: 
Until the end of 1949 Stalin did not plan any aggression against South Korea. Instead he 
was worried about an attack from the South, and did everything to avoid provoking 
Washington and Seoul. In 1947-1948 Soviet leaders still believed in the possibility of a 
unification of Korea, ....39 [emphasis added] 
However, Kim Il Sung, within months after the creation of the DPRK, had begun to press 
Stalin for approval of an attack on South Korea. Preparatory to an invasion, Kim Il Sung 
proposed in January 1949 signing a Soviet-North Korean Treaty of Friendship and 
Alliance. Stalin rejected the idea, arguing that it would receive world condemnation for 
perpetuating Korea's division. But he no doubt also was refusing an obligation to defend 
the DPRK if Kim initiated a war and the United States intervened. When Soviet 
Ambassador in Pyongyang, Terentii F. Shtykov, informed Kim Il Sung and Foreign 
Minister Pak Hon-yong that "to conclude a friendship treaty is not timely," the two 
"embarrassed" North Korean leaders suggested a "secret treaty" for Soviet military 
assistance as an alternative.40
Shtykov played a key role in causing Stalin to be cautious and skeptical in how he reacted 
to Kim Il Sung's lobbying for an invasion. Starting early in 1949, he began reporting a 
growing number of military clashes at the 38th parallel, complaining bitterly that North 
Korea "did not have enough trained personnel, adequate weapons and sufficient numbers 
of bullets to rebuff intensifying incursions from the South." When Kim Il Sung headed a 
delegation that visited Moscow to secure expanded economic assistance, Stalin made it 
clear that he would not sanction the DPRK provoking a war in Korea. In their meeting on 
5 March, Stalin agreed to provide North Korea with Soviet technical trainers and between 
$40 and 50 million in credit to buy imports, as well as promising cultural exchanges. But 
he then issued a blunt warning to Kim Il Sung: "The 38th parallel must be peaceful. It is 
very important."41 Nevertheless, Kim pressed for an invasion, telling Stalin that military 
means would be necessary to liberate all of Korea because "reactionary forces of the 
South will never agree on a peaceful reunification and will perpetuate the division of the 
country until they feel themselves strong enough to attack the North." It was the right 
time to attack because the Korean People's Army (KPA) was stronger than South Korea's 
army, guerrilla forces would support the invasion, and the southern people hated the Rhee 
regime.42
Stalin firmly rejected Kim Il Sung's request, explaining that the United States likely 
would intervene because it would view an attack on the south as violating its agreement 
with the Soviet Union establishing the division at the 38th parallel, thereby igniting a 
major war. Moreover, US troops still were deployed in the south and the KPA was 
weaker than its adversary in South Korea. Stalin said that Kim could not invade until he 
gained "overwhelming superiority." "Does it mean that there is no chance to reunify 
Korea in the near future?," Kim Il Sung persisted. "Our people are very anxious to be 
together again and to cast off the yoke of the reactionary regime and their American 
masters." Stalin, according to Kim, then predicted that a North Korean invasion was "not 
necessary" because South Korea would strike first, thus allowing Pyongyang to portray 
its offensive as a counterattack. "Then your move will be understood and supported by 
everyone," the Soviet leader explained. But despite these warnings, Stalin's expectations 
of war in Korea rose after Kim's departure. On 17 April, he cabled Shtykov that an attack 
on North Korea from the south was imminent. In reply, the Soviet ambassador confirmed 
that the United States was supporting a military buildup in South Korea, advising that the 
DPRK could not prevent the outbreak of war. Stalin then castigated Shtykov for failing to 
act firmly enough to maintain peace.43
Soviet intelligence reports during April of American preparations to withdraw further 
raised Stalin's level of anxiety. After US forces departed, the 
UN commission will also leave Korea. In April-May the Southerners will concentrate 
their troops near the 38th parallel. In June the Southerners will start a sudden attack on 
the North in order to finish the total destruction of the Northern army by August. 
Shtykov reported that the United States and South Korea were negotiating procedures for 
withdrawal with participation of the UN commission. South Korea's military leaders 
thought it could "inflict a perceptible blow" if North Korea attacked because the ROK 
army had increased in size from 53,900 to 70,000 since the year began. Along with 
reinforcements from youth groups, the South Korean military was ready to receive 
additional American weapons and equipment. Furthermore, South Korea was moving 
troops to the parallel in accordance with completed plans for an invasion and already had 
acted to crush guerrilla forces in the south. Shtykov predicted an attack in June. In 
response, democratic forces in South Korea, he urged Stalin, "must carry out diversion, 
terror and organize an uprising." The Soviet ambassador had spoken to Kim and Pak 
about the necessity to raise the vigilance and expand the strength of North Korea's army 
and police.44
These dire warnings of North Korea's vulnerability only reinforced Kim's determination 
to gain not only Soviet approval for forcible reunification, but the military assistance 
necessary to achieve this objective. On 28 April, Kim Il Sung asked Shtykov to deliver a 
personal message to Stalin stressing the necessity of strengthening the KPA. He proposed 
implementation of a plan to expand immediately the DPRK's mechanized and airpower 
capabilities.45 Unwilling to rely entirely on an unenthusiastic Stalin, Kim approached the 
the Chinese as well, hoping that Mao Zedong would endorse his plans for reunification. 
Early in May 1949, Kim Il, chief of political administrator for the KPA, met with Chinese 
leaders in Beijing. Mao approved of Pyongyang's desire to liberate the south and even 
promised assistance of Chinese troops if necessary. But he advised against haste, urging 
the DPRK to wait until the Chinese completed their revolutionary war. Acknowledging 
that conflict in Korea was possible at any moment, Mao voiced concern about the 
Japanese entering the fighting, but then denied any reason for worry. "If necessary," he 
explained, "we can throw in for you Chinese soldiers, all of us are black, Americans will 
not see the difference." Then Mao concluded with another warning against an advance 
against South Korea in the "near future" because world conditions were unfavorable and 
the Chinese were preoccupied with their civil war. Anticipating victory, however, Beijing 
confirmed plans for for the return of two divisions of Korean troops fighting in China.46
Pyongyang's pressure on Beijing to endorse and support a military assault on South 
Korea undoubtedly increased Stalin's anxiety about the imminence of war in Korea. 
Causing further alarm was Shtykov's exaggerated estimates of the danger of the South 
Koreans staging an invasion during the summer of 1949. Determined to avoid war with 
the United States or sacrifice his buffer zone in Korea, Stalin instructed Shtykov and Kim 
Il Sung strictly to avoid provoking an assault from the south. He also ordered the 
dismantling of the Soviet naval base in Chongjin and the air force liaison offices in both 
Kanggye and Pyongyang to "demonstrate to the world our intentions, psychologically 
disarm the adversaries and to prevent our participation in the possible war against 
Southern aggression."47 But Stalin faced a difficult dilemma. It was essential to provide 
North Korea with enough military assistance to deter an attack from the south without 
giving so much that Kim Il Sung could initiate an invasion. In June 1949, just before US 
troops left South Korea, Moscow and Pyongyang signed a special protocol on military-
technical aid, providing for the Soviet Union to supply its ally with large amounts of 
combat aircraft, tanks, cannon, landing ships, machine guns, and engineering equipment. 
Not surprisingly, this did not satisfy Kim Il Sung, who soon was requesting more 
materials, as well as assistance to enlarge North Korea's navy.48
On 12 August, Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon-yong met with Shtykov to ask that he again 
convey to Stalin the reasons supporting approval of an invasion. First, peaceful 
reunification was a total impossibility. Second, the Korean people would not understand 
if Pyongyang missed the chance to reunite the nation. Third, North Korean forces were 
superior to those in the south. Fourth, the withdrawal of US troops meant the 38th 
parallel had lost its meaning. Last, waiting to counterattack, as Stalin proposed, was no 
longer possible because South Korea had postponed its planned offensive against the 
north. After summarizing these arguments in a cable to Stalin, Shtykov warned that South 
Korea probably had the power to stage a counterattack, causing the fighting to assume a 
prolonged character. He therefore advised against authorizing a general offensive because 
the United States might intervene and even use Japanese troops. Furthermore, because the 
United States and other nations had recognized South Korea, Washington could use the 
invasion to justify a hostile campaign against the Soviet Union. Also, the majority of 
Koreans might support a North Korean attempt at reunification, but the KPA did not have 
the overwhelming superiority to ensure victory. Finally, South Korea possessed a strong 
army and police force. Apparently, Stalin accepted Shtykov's advice and ruled out a 
general offensive.49
Soviet documents demonstrate that during 1949 Stalin was consistently opposed to an 
invasion of South Korea because North Korea had not achieved either military superiority 
north of the parallel or political strength south of that line. He was more concerned about 
South Korea's threat to the survival of North Korea, regularly asking for estimates of the 
military balance on the peninsula.50 Undaunted, Kim Il Sung early in September asked 
Moscow to approve a limited invasion, claiming that South Korea was preparing attacks 
to occupy more of the Ongjin peninsula on the west coast of Korea, as well as to shell a 
cement plant in Haeju north of the parallel. Kim advanced a plan for a campaign to seize 
all of Ongjin and land adjacent to the south running eastward roughly to Kaesong. This 
would preempt the southern attack and improve North Korea's defensive position, as well 
as positioning the KPA to occupy Seoul in two weeks or two months at most. 
Contradicting rumors of an imminent attack, the Soviet embassy reported, however, that 
"there have not been any serious incidents" along the border since August 15. Shtykov 
told Mun Il, Kim Il Sung's personal secretary, that the proposal raised "large and serious" 
issues, urging that Kim wait for a response from Moscow. But on 1 September, he 
recommended approval of the limited operation to seize Ongjin, although he did not 
comment on the logic of Kim's proposal.51
Stalin must have worried that if he ignored Kim's warnings, South Korea might be in the 
position to ignite the war that he was desperate to avoid. He also was concerned that a 
limited offensive would escalate into a major war. Stalin therefore ordered a new 
appraisal of the situation in Korea. Indicative of his predisposition against aggressive 
action in Korea, he chose not to rely on Shtykov's advice and instead instructed the 
Soviet embassy in Pyongyang to study the military, political, and international 
implications of an attack on the south. Stalin wanted to know "how real and advisable is 
the proposal of our friends." He asked for specifics on the military capabilities of the 
South Korean army, the strength of the partisan movement in the south and the "degree of 
real assistance which guerrillas could render to North Koreans," and the reaction of the 
South Korean masses to North Korea "being the first to start military action." Stalin 
requested information as well regarding the scope of the US military presence in South 
Korea, the "possible reaction of Americans to the invasion from the North," and "Kim Il 
Sung's evaluation of the capabilities of his own armed forces."52
Soviet Embassy officials met with Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon-yong on 12 September. Kim 
sounded desperate when, after claiming that the enemy's army was weak, he confessed 
that the success of the invasion would depend on demoralized South Korean soldiers 
refusing to fight. The strength of the guerrilla movement was about 1,500 and 2,000 and 
recently had "somewhat broadened," but Kim admitted that the KPA "could not count on 
substantial help from the partisans." Pak disagreed, claiming that the guerrillas would 
make a significant contribution especially in disrupting communications and staging 
diversionary actions. Kim Il Sung estimated that at that time roughly 900 US advisors 
and instructors were in South Korea and about 1,500 US soldiers and officers guarded 
various installations in the south. After North Korea attacked, the United States might 
reinforce South Korea's army with Guomindang or Japanese troops, US naval and air 
support, or the military engagement of its advisors. Kim Il Sung then conceded that "if a 
civil war is drawn out, then [the DPRK] will be in a politically disadvantageous 
position." He admitted that the limited operation might evolve into full-scale war, but 
doubted that this would happen because South Korea would not dare attack other areas 
along the parallel. Kim at first said South Korea's people would react with anger, but later 
predicted they would welcome the invasion.53
Rather than Shtykov, Grigorii I. Tunkin, Soviet embassy charge d'affaires, sent the cable 
to Moscow summarizing the results of the meetings with the North Koreans and offering 
recommendations. Tunkin warned that putting Kim Il Sung's plan into practice probably 
would lead to unleashing civil war because "there are quite a few adherents of civil war 
in the ruling circles of both North and South Korea." This would be disadvantageous to 
the DPRK "in the existing stuation" because the KPA was not strong enough to achieve a 
quick victory even if the possible assistance from the guerrillas were taken into 
consideration. A protracted civil war would provide the United States with the 
opportunity to expand assistance to the Rhee regime. Worse, after the defeat Jiang in 
China, the Americans would risk a far more determined involvement in Korea, doing 
everything to save the ROK. The South Korean people also would develop a negative 
attitude toward the initiators of the civil war, blaming the North Koreans for resultant 
suffering, sacrifices, and hardships. "Moreover," Tunkin warned, "a drawn out war in 
Korea could be used by the Americans for purposes of agitation against the Soviet Union 
and for further inflaming war hysteria." Even a successful operation to seize the Ongjin 
peninsula would not be worthwhile because it would prompt charges that Pyongyang was 
trying to provoke a fratricidal war, as well as providing a pretext for greater American 
intervention in Korean affairs. As a result, Tunkin absolutely opposed not only approving 
a full-scale war, but also Kim's limited operation on Ongjin because it would have the 
same impact and result.54  
Not surprisingly, the Soviet Politburo on 24 September ordered Shtykov to inform the 
DPRK that it had rejected its request for approval of its plan to stage even a limited 
invasion because a quick victory was unlikely. Not only was the KPA too weak, but 
Pyongyang had not done enough to raise the level of preparation of the South Korean 
masses to join in active struggle. Soviet leaders believed that "only in conditions of a 
peoples' uprising ... which is undermining the foundations of the reactionary regime, 
could a military attack ... play a decisive role in the ... unification of all Korea into a 
single democratic state." More important, a North Korean attack "would give the 
Americans a pretext for all kinds of interference into Korean affairs": 
An attack on South Korea would be regarded as an invasion by the DPRK and assessed 
as the willful outbreak of an internal war brought on by the DPRK. If that took place, the 
U.S. would be presented with the rationale that would enable it to make the issue of 
invasion by the DPRK the legal basis in the United Nations for receiving UN permission 
to dispatch U.S. troops to South Korea and there would be prolonged stationing of 
foreign troops in South Korea, which in the end would result in delaying Korea's 
unification.55
The Politburo thought about repeating the orders of March against crossing the parallel 
except in response to attacks from the south. Instead, it advised the North Koreans to be 
ready, "in case the South starts an offensive against the North, to defeat the Southern 
army and unite the country under the leadership of your government." But "Premier Kim 
Il Sung must not fail to take into account the possibility for the peaceful unification of 
Korea." After Stalin approved, the Politiburo cabled its decision to Shtykov. On 4 
October, Kim "negatively received" the news that Moscow had rejected his plan.56
Until the end of 1949, Stalin was committed to avoiding war in Korea, an approach that 
paralleled US policy toward the divided nation. Cumings writes that the significance of 
this symmetry was how it demonstrated "the hardwon, learned logic of this civil war by 
late 1949, namely, that both sides understood that their big power guarantors would not 
help them if they launched an unprovoked general attack - or even an assault on Ongjin 
or Ch'orwon."57 During October, Stalin sharply reprimanded Shtykov for not reporting 
border clashes that the North Koreans had instigated, chastising the Soviet ambassador 
for allowing attacks on South Korean positions along the 38th parallel. "Such 
provocations are very dangerous for our interests and can induce the adversary to launch 
a big war," Stalin bluntly declared.58 But the establishment of the PRC early that month 
had a dramatic impact on Soviet policy in Asia. Stalin's contentious discussions with Mao 
in Moscow from late 1949 to early 1950 indicated the difficulties of this reorientation, as 
the Soviet leader searched for a new strategy to retain his unquestioned leadership of 
revolutionary Communist movements. After the Communist victory in China, Stalin did 
not initiate policy in Asia, but allowed events to dictate the decisions leading to the 
outbreak of the Korean War. 
Mao's victory in China motivated Kim Il Sung to increase his pressure on Stalin. Creation 
of the PRC also allowed North Korea's leader, in the words of Kathryn Weathersby, to 
employ "the strategy he later used so extensively of playing China and the Soviet Union 
against one another."59 On 17 January 1950, at a luncheon that Pak Hon-yong hosted at 
the North Korean Foreign Ministry, Kim Il Sung complained to Shtykov that the South 
Koreans had not provided the necessary pretext to justify a counterattack. The 
Communist victory in China meant that Korea "was next in line." He requested approval 
to visit Moscow to receive "orders and permission" from Stalin for an attack on the 
Ongjin peninsula, predicting that offensive action thereafter would result in the KPA 
capturing Seoul within a few days. "I can't sleep at night because I am thinking of the 
unification of the whole country," Kim Il Sung moaned. "If the cause ... is postponed, 
then I may lose the confidence of the Korean people." Kim, who was intoxicated, then 
resorted to blackmail, stating that if Stalin refused to see him, he would visit Beijing and 
ask China to fulfill its pledge to support an invasion.60 This latest plea came five days 
after the Press Club speech, yet Kim Il Sung, thinking Acheson had placed South Korea 
inside the US defensive perimeter, made no mention of it. 
Stalin approved Kim Il Sung's request to visit Moscow. Responding to Shtykov's 
summary of Kim's remarks, the Soviet leader, almost three weeks after Acheson left 
South Korea outside the US "defensive perimeter," was vague and tentative, still stressing 
the need for caution: 
I understand the unhappiness of comrade Kim Il Sung, but he must understand that such a 
large matter regarding South Korea ... requires thorough preparation. It has to be 
organized in such a way that there will not be a large risk. If he wants to talk to me on 
this issue, then I'll always be ready to receive him and talk to him. ... I am prepared to 
help him in this matter. 
Stalin also asked for Korea to provide yearly a minimum of 25,000 tons of lead. "It is 
possible that Kim Il Sung needs our technical assistance and some number of Soviet 
specialists," Stalin added. "We are ready to render this assistance." Mao was in Moscow 
at that time, but Stalin did not tell him about the plans for war because, despite Acheson's 
speech, he was not ready to approve an invasion. Shtykov met Kim Il Sung on 30 January 
to brief him on Stalin's decisions. North Korea's leader received this information "with 
great satisfaction." "Your agreement to receive him and your readiness to assist him in 
this matter made an especially strong impression," Shtykov reported. Kim said to convey 
his gratitude several times, asking repeatedly for confirmation that Stalin had approved a 
meeting. Kim Il Sung also stated that he would take all the necessary steps to ship the 
lead and would remove all problems regarding the matter within two weeks.61
To date, only one released Soviet document records a discussion among Communist 
leaders of Acheson's Press Club speech. On 17 January 1950, Soviet leaders Vyacheslav 
M. Molotov and Andrei Y. Vyshinsky met with Mao during the latter's visit to Moscow 
to negotiate the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance. Significantly, their 
discussion of Acheson's speech focused on US China policy, without any reference to 
Korea. In his diary entry, Molotov writes that he raised the issue of the address, telling 
Mao that Acheson's statements concerning 
international matters, in particular, matters concerning China, USSR and their mutual 
relations ... are a clear slander against the Soviet Union and were designed to deceive 
directly public opinion. The United States went bankrupt with its policy in China, and 
now Acheson is trying to justify himself, without shying away from deceitful means in 
the process. 
Molotov then quoted from a translation of the speech, focusing on Acheson's allegations 
that the Soviet Union had incorporated Outer Mongolia and was in the process of 
partitioning Manchuria. He gave a full text of the speech to Mao, advising him "to 
familiarize himself with" it. In response, Mao stated that "until now, as is known, these 
fabrications were the job of all kinds of scoundrels, represented by American journalists 
and correspondents." That the US secretary of state was now doing "the dirty work" 
showed how "the Americans are making progress!"62
Discussion of the speech continued with Molotov explaining that Soviet leaders thought 
Moscow and Beijing "should respond accordingly." He then remarked that according to a 
TASS report from Washington on 14 January, 
the former consul general in Mukden, [Angus] Ward, while responding to questions from 
the press, stated the very opposite of what Acheson said in his speech on 12 January. In 
addition, I quoted the appropriate portion of Ward's declaration, which stated that he did 
not see any signs which would point to the Soviet Union's control over the administration 
of Manchuria or its attempts to incorporate Manchuria into the USSR, even though the 
Soviet Union is exercising its treaty rights concerning the joint administration of KchZhD 
[Chinese Chungchun Railroad]. 
Mao agreed with Molotov's proposal for both the Soviet and Chinese foreign ministries 
"to make a statement on the matter" that "will expose Acheson's slanderous fabrications . 
. .." He then asked if the speech could "be a kind of smokescreen, using which, the 
American imperialists will attempt to occupy the island of Formosa?" Molotov replied 
that "the Americans are trying . . . to create misunderstandings in the relations between 
the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China." It was "impossible to disagree 
that" it was a "smokescreen, in order to carry out their plans of occupation." Discussion 
then turned to China's refusal to establish any diplomatic contacts with the United States 
and Soviet efforts to seat the PRC in the United Nations.63
On 2 February, Stalin dispatched new instructions to Shtykov reflecting his continuing 
concerns about the dangers involved in launching an invasion of South Korea. Stalin 
ordered his ambassador to 
explain to Comrade Kim Il Sung that at this point the question he wants to discuss with 
me must be completely confidential. It should not be shared with anyone even in the 
North Korean leadership, as well as with the Chinese comrades. This is dictated by the 
preoccupation with keeping the topic unknown to the adversary. 
If Stalin had paid any attention to Acheson's speech, apparently it did not eliminate his 
anticipation of US intervention to block Communist conquest of Korea. Shtykov reported 
to Stalin on 7 February the issues discussed in his meeting three days earlier with Kim Il 
Sung. North Korea's leader asked if the Soviet government would grant the DPRK a loan 
and proposed sending to Moscow representatives with draft bonds valued at 2 billion 
won. He also wanted Stalin's permission to arm, equip, and train three more divisions to 
bring the total KPA strength to ten. Shtykov replied that the "question is large and 
serious" because approval would require large amounts of material resources. Kim Il 
Sung then explained that during 1950 he wanted to use the credit the Soviet government 
had promised to North Korea under the 17 April 1949 agreement for 1951, so that 
Pyongyang could fund this military expansion. Stalin wrote in response to these three 
requests in the margin "it is possible" and at the top of the cable to "give an answer 
today."64
Motivating Stalin's decision to expand North Korea's military capabilities was more a 
desire to ensure the DPRK's survival than to promote aggressive expansion. Regardless 
of the reasons, Shtykov reported on 10 February that predictably Kim Il Sung received 
word of the decision "enthusiastically and several times asked me to communicate to 
Comrade Stalin his gratitude for his assistance." Shtykov informed Kim Il Sung on 12 
March that the Soviet government would approve his request to use the 1951 credit 
during 1950. Three days earlier, Shtykov had transmitted to Moscow a note from Kim Il 
Sung requesting that the Soviet government send military-technical equipment to North 
Korea in the amount of 120 to 150 million rubles. This was pursuant to Stalin's approval 
of his previous request for help in providing an enlarged KPA with arms, ammunition, 
and technical equipment. In return, the DPRK would send the Soviet Union 9 tons of 
gold, 40 tons silver, and 15,000 tons in monazite concentrate, worth a total of 
133,050,500 rubles. Kim Il Sung asked that the Soviets dispatch the requested military 
supplies as soon as possible. On 16 March, Shtykov sent Moscow another note from Kim 
with an attached seven-page list that itemized the KPA's needs in the categories of 
artillery armaments, ammunition, engineering supplies, military-medical equipment, and 
military aviation supplies. Kim Il Sung stated his hope that the needs of the "young 
republic" could be met in the "shortest period."65
Kim Il Sung thus applied pressure on the Soviets to expand the DPRK's military even 
before his meeting with Stalin to gain approval for an invasion. On 18 March 1950, Stalin 
transmitted his decisions regarding Kim's specific requests, first expressing thanks after 
learning that the North Korea leader was sending the lead. With respect to weapons, 
ammunition, and technical equipment, Moscow had "decided also to satisfy fully this 
request of yours." Shtykov met Kim on 20 March and gave him the text of Stalin's letter, 
with Pak present for the discussions. After expressing his gratitude, Kim Il Sung said that 
he and Pak wanted a meeting with Stalin early in April, adding that this would be an 
unofficial meeting in the same manner as had occurred in 1945. Among the issues they 
planned to raise were first, the "path and methods of unification of the south and the north 
of the country," second, "prospects for the economic development of the country," and 
third, "possibly several party questions." After receiving instructions, Shtykov visited 
Kim Il Sung on 24 March to inform him that Stalin had approved discussions in Moscow 
during the first week of April. Kim and Pak left on 30 March.66
North Korea's leaders were in Moscow for almost the entire month of April, meeting with 
Stalin three times. Stalin gave tentative approval for an invasion, outlining his views on 
preparations for the war. No minutes of the conversations have surfaced, but recollections 
of those present and foreign ministry reports provide information on what transpired. 
Stalin confirmed to Kim Il Sung that the "international environment has sufficiently 
changed to permit a more active stance on the unification of Korea." He pointed to the 
Communist victory in China as having "improved the environment for actions in Korea" 
because Beijing was no longer distracted and "can devote attention and energy to the 
assistance of Korea." This included the possible use of Chinese troops. Mao's triumph, 
Stalin elaborated,  
is also important psychologically. It has proved the strength of Asian revolutionaries, and 
shown the weakness of Asian reactionaries and their mentors in the West, in America. 
Americans left China and did not dare to challenge the new Chinese authorities militarily. 
A second factor was the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance. 
"According to information coming from the United States," Stalin explained, this 
agreement had made the United States much "more hesitant to challenge the Communists 
in Asia." "The prevailing [U.S.] mood is not to interfere" because the Soviets now had the 
atomic bomb and "our positions are solidified in Pyongyang."67 But he did not mention 
Acheson's speech. 
Despite his decision to authorize planning for an invasion, Stalin still was fearful of US 
military intervention. In preparation for this contingency, he declared that North Korea 
could stage an offensive only if the PRC approved. Stalin emphasized the necessity for 
thorough preparation. He promised to satisfy the need for more mechanized means and 
weapons for a strike force of fully-equipped attack divisions. He outlined a plan calling 
for movement of assault troops into position and then announcing a proposal for peaceful 
reunification. North Korean forces would strike first at Ongjin, "as it will help to disguise 
who initiated the combat activities," and broaden the front in response to South Korean 
counterattacks. "The war should be quick and speedy," Stalin stressed. "Southerners and 
Americans should not have time to come to their senses ... to put up a strong resistance 
and to mobilize international support." But "Stalin repeated that the USSR was not ready 
to get involved in Korean affairs directly, especially if Americans did venture to send 
troops to Korea." Moscow had too many other problems to cope with elsewhere. Kim Il 
Sung then reiterated that a military victory would be easy, especially because of support 
from the guerrilla movement and an expected uprising. "Americans won't have time to 
prepare," he insisted, "and by the time they come to their senses, all the Korean people 
will be enthusiastically supporting the new government." Stalin instructed the DPRK's 
Command General Staff to devise concrete plans with the help of Soviet advisors.68
Bajanov identifies the Communist victory in China and the Soviet testing of an atomic 
device as key factors motivating Stalin to approve an invasion of South Korea. But he 
adds the establishment of NATO and the deterioration of Soviet relations with the United 
States, as well as "a perceived weakening of Washington's position and of its will to get 
involved militarily in Asia." He also contends that "Stalin was now more confident of the 
Communist bloc's strength, less respectful of American capabilities and less interested in 
the reaction of Western public opinion to communist moves." Soviet records do not 
provide specific documentary evidence to substantiate his speculations. But Bajanov 
accurately notes that Stalin did not discuss the issue of initiating a Korean war with Mao. 
According to Bajanov, he wanted to work out attack plans on his own and then present 
Beijing with a fait accompli. Then "Mao would have no choice but to agree with the 
invasion and assist it," he writes, adding that while in Moscow, Stalin rejected Mao's 
desire to seize Taiwan so it would be difficult to secure approval for Korea earlier in the 
year.69 Stalin in fact had opposed aggressive action against both Taiwan and South Korea 
at the outset of 1950. It was not until April that the Soviet leader decided to authorize 
preparations for implementing Kim Il Sung's invasion plan. Even then, however, Stalin's 
fear of US intervention resulted in him imposing a condition that North Korea could not 
attack without Mao's consent. 
Following the April meeting, Moscow and Pyongyang moved energetically to prepare for 
war. Meanwhile, the United States was expanding not only its commitments in South 
Korea, but elsewhere in Asia. By May, Congress had approved the first two years of its 
economic aid package to the ROK and the Truman administration had increased military 
aid in response to progress toward economic recovery and political stability in South 
Korea.70 Certainly, Stalin was aware of this growing US support for the ROK. 
Undoubtedly, he also knew that Truman and his advisors were studying the 
recommendations in NSC Paper 68, calling for major increases in defense spending. For 
both Stalin and Kim, time was running out. By late May, the Soviet military equipment 
Stalin promised had arrived and North Korea was ready to invade. Kim Il Sung, after 
inspecting the newly-formed divisions, reported to Shtykov that the KPA would be 
prepared to launch an offensive at the end of June. He also had approved the specific 
invasion plan that the North Korean Command General Staff had devised with the advice 
of Soviet Lieutenant General P. Vasiliev. At first, the Soviets favored an invasion in July, 
but Kim Il Sung insisted upon late June because he feared Seoul would learn of the attack 
plans and the July rains would slow the advance. After Vasiliev agreed, Shtykov 
requested approval for the target date.71
While Kim Il Sung was in Moscow, there was progress toward achieving two other 
important parts of North Korea's invasion plan. Kim Dar Sen, who was a leader in the 
South Korean guerrilla movement, arrived in Pyongyang on 3 April to report on the 
status of partisan activities in the south and work out a program for action before and 
after invasion. In addition, Kim Il Sung had received a report from Li Zhou-yuan, North 
Korea's ambassador to the PRC, regarding his talks with Mao in Beijing at end of March 
1950. Li had raised the possibility of a meeting between Kim and Mao. Mao agreed and 
suggested the end of April or early in May. China's leader connected the proposed 
meeting "with the question of the unification of Korea, indicating in this regard that if 
there is a concrete plan for the unification of Korea, then the meeting should be organized 
secretly, but if there is not yet such a plan for unification of Korea, then [it] can be 
conducted officially." Li did not offer a response regarding the date and form of the 
meeting, explaining that Kim Il Sung was then undergoing medical treatment. Kim in fact 
was at that moment on his way to Moscow to confer with Stalin. Mao then commented 
that in the event of another world war, Korea would not escape the fighting. Therefore, 
Kim had to prepare military for this eventuality. He also voiced the desire to expand trade 
relations between the PRC and the DPRK.72  
Kim Il Sung met with Shtykov on 12 May to brief him about what China's leaders had 
told Ambassador Li. He reported that Zhou Enlai had proposed an official meeting 
between Mao and Kim. But Mao, 
as if asking when you intend to begin the unification of the country, without waiting for 
an answer stated that if you intend to begin military operations against the south in the 
near future, then they should not be meeting officially. In such a case the trip should be 
unofficial. 
According to Kim, China's leader 
added further that the unification of Korea by peaceful means is not possible, solely 
military means are required to unify Korea. As regards the Americans, there is no need to 
be afraid of them. The Americans will not enter a third world war for such a small 
territory. 
Kim Il Sung then told Shtykov that he had received word from Li that day of Mao's 
approval of a meeting. He and Pak Hon-yong would leave the following morning for 
Beijing. Kim then stated that he already had issued all orders to prepare for offensive 
operations and the Command General Staff was implementing them with the target date 
set for late June. "But he is still not convinced that they will manage it in this period," 
Shtykov reported.73 Apparently, Kim Il Sung thought he would not have any trouble 
persuading Mao Zedong to approve his invasion plan at their upcoming meeting. 
Kim Il Sung also outlined to Shtykov the issues he planned to discuss with Mao. First, he 
would "inform about their intentions about unifying the country by military means and to 
report about the results of the discussions on this question in Moscow." Second, he 
"intends to propose that they sign a trade agreement in the nearest future, but that they 
sign an agreement about friendship after the unification of the country." Third, he would 
cover "several questions which were placed under discussion with Comrade Stalin ... 
about the establishment of closer communications between the Central Committee of the 
labor party of Korea and the communist party of China." Fourth, they would "exchange 
opinions on several questions which interest both Korea and China such as the electrical 
station at Suiho, Koreans who live in China and so forth." Kim Il Sung then asked for 
Shtykov's advice on "what questions he should raise before Mao Zedong from the point 
of view of assistance in the intended operation." But the Soviet ambassador declined, 
explaining that Kim had a better idea of his insufficiencies and how China could help 
him. Kim Il Sung then explained that he had planned to ask for the ammunition for the 
American and Japanese weapons that returning Koreans had brought with them and also 
"for some number of horses." After talking to his army chief of staff, however, he had 
decided that this was not needed. Kim Il Sung then "stated that he doesn't have more 
requests for Mao about assistance, since all his requests were satisfied in Moscow and the 
necessary and sufficient assistance was given him there."74
Soviet Ambassador in Beijing N.V. Roshchin reported to Stalin the results of the meeting 
between Kim and Mao on 15 May. Mao approved of Stalin's three-stage plan, but pointed 
out that Moscow's agreement with the United States on the 38th parallel precluded Soviet 
involvement. He then stressed that it was necessary to prepare the KPA well for the 
forthcoming operation. He recommended to Kim that the KPA, following the Chinese 
Communist army's example, "must act swiftly, go around big cities not wasting time on 
their takeover, concentrating their efforts on destroying the armed force of the 
adversary." Mao asked about possible intervention of Japanese troops. Kim Il Sung 
thought this was "not very probable," but speculated that "the Americans might decide to 
send to Korea 20-30,000 Japanese soldiers." If this happened, however, the "Koreans 
would be fighting in such a case even tougher." Mao was more cautious, pointing out that 
Japanese participation might prolong the war. More important, it was "not so much the 
Japanese, as the Americans themselves who could interfere ...." Kim then repeated 
Stalin's assertion that the Americans "left China without fighting; the same approach can 
be expected in Korea."75 After receiving this summary, Stalin cabled Roshchin that after 
"the big cause of the liberation and unification of Korea has been completed, the treaty 
[of friendship and alliance] should be signed," arguing that this step would "solidify the 
successes of the Korean comrades and prevent foreign interference in Korean affairs."76  
"Unfortunately," Bajanov writes, the final period (May-June 1950) before the attack is 
not well documented ...."77 But existing evidence shows that North Korea began to 
concentrate forces near the 38th parallel on 12 June and concluded offensive deployment 
eleven days later in accordance with the prescribed plan. "The planning of the operation 
at the divisional level and the reconnaissance of the area," Shtykov reported later, "was 
carried out with the participation of Soviet advisors."78 There was a 
special meeting for commanders of divisions and of the first echelon. At this meeting 
specific and concrete assignments were given to each formation. Special stress was put 
on keeping total secrecy of the preliminary arrangements. The adversary's intelligence 
must not learn anything through ground operations or from the air. 
As the target date drew near, Stalin still was concerned about possible US military 
intervention. He approved the use of Soviet ships to transport KPA forces staging 
amphibious landings, but prohibited participation of Soviet personnel "because it may 
give the adversary a pretext for interference by the USA." Then, on 21 June, Shtykov 
informed Stalin that a sudden South Korean military buildup on the Ongjin peninsula 
indicated awareness of the impending attack. Pyongyang wanted approval to expand the 
assault along the whole border in a full-scale offensive. Stalin gave his consent, altering 
dramatically the character of the war that began on 25 June 1950.79
Acheson's National Press Club speech had no perceptible impact on the events leading to 
the outbreak of the Korean War. Until the moment North Korea attacked South Korea, 
Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong worried about US military intervention. Kim Il Sung 
displayed remarkable political talent, as he manipulated his patrons into supporting his 
plan for invasion. He was able to persuade Stalin and Mao that his forces would achieve 
victory before the United States could intervene not because the Americans would not act 
to save South Korea. Stalin still hesitated, making his approval contingent on the Chinese 
endorsing the invasion. Again, Kim manipulated his patrons. When he arrived in Beijing 
in May 1950, North Korea's leader told Mao that Stalin had said "North Korea can move 
toward actions," but "this question should be discussed with China ...." Replying to a 
request for clarification, Stalin informed Mao of his instructions to Kim "that the question 
should be decided finally by the Chinese and Korean comrades together, and in case of 
disagreement by the Chinese comrades the decision on the question should be postponed 
until a new discussion."80 Mao gave his reluctant consent, but Stalin had authorized only 
a limited offensive to seize Ongjin. Predictably, Kim exploited Stalin's exaggerated 
estimates of South Korea's strength and fears of a protracted war bringing US 
intervention to secure approval for the full-scale offensive to achieve reunification he had 
wanted all along. 
Some scholars have relied on the released Soviet documents to revive traditional 
interpretations of the Korean War. For example, Soh Jin-chull writes in a recent paper 
that "clearly ... the Korean War was 'initiated' and 'realized' by Stalin with the cooperation 
of Communist China." As part of a "collective conspiracy," he concludes, "it was the 
North Korean Communist counterpart who loyally obeyed and executed this War."81 
Similarly, writers have attempted to attribute Stalin's decision to support an invasion of 
South Korea to Acheson's Press Club speech. Kim Hakjoon claims that when Stalin 
referred during his April meeting with Kim Il Sung to favorable changes in the 
international environment, he "probably had in mind the speech given ... by U.S. 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson three months earlier in January, 1950."82 According to 
James G. Hershberger, Acheson's speech "may have been seen in Moscow as lending 
credence to the argument that Washington would not intervene militarily to rescue South 
Korea from being overrun."83 "The timing of Stalin's approval," Weathersby initially 
concluded in 1995, "must therefore have been at least in part a response to the new 
defense policy ... that placed South Korea outside the American defense perimeter in the 
Pacific."84 But Soviet documents do not sustain this interpretation, not least because just 
one of them even mentions the Press Club speech.  
Stalin thought US military intervention was possible until the very day the Korean War 
began. But he authorized North Korea's invasion because he feared that delay would give 
South Korea the chance to stage an offensive to destroy the DPRK at some future date. 
His anxiety about the North Korea's weakness, though unfounded, had been the principal 
reason for his refusal to approve an offensive since late 1948. In the spring of 1950, 
Stalin could not have ignored signs that US policy in Asia was stiffening. "In his mind," 
Weathersby writes of Stalin, "the American failure to ensure a Guomindang victory in 
China indicated that Washington 'was not ready' to intervene in Korea, rather than that it 
had abandoned its intention to take over the North at a more propitious moment."85 North 
Korea's conquest of the ROK would remove this possibility. Finally, as Nikita 
Khrushchev recalled later, "Stalin couldn't oppose the idea [of invading South Korea] 
since it would undermine his reputation as a staunch defender of revolutionary 
movements."86 For the same reason, Acheson was confident Stalin would not permit Kim 
Il Sung to attempt reunification through military means because open aggression would 
confirm the charges of Soviet imperialism he had made in his National Press Club 
speech. Ironically, the Korean War began not because Stalin knew the United States 
would not intervene, but rather because he feared it would do so before North Korea 
eliminated the gravest threat to its survival. 
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